This study finds that the value relevance of financial statements follows a 'sawtooth' pattern as firms mature within and across private and public equity markets. Specifically, I show that the strength of the associations between the equity values and financial statements of U.S. biotech companies rises as firms mature toward an IPO, falls at the IPO, and increases again after the IPO. I argue that this pattern is due to underlying sawtooth dynamics in firms' investment opportunity sets and in the financial sophistication of the marginal investor in firms' stock. I also find that the financial statements of U.S. biotech companies are value relevant in surprisingly similar ways in private as compared to public markets. In each market, equity values are positively related to R&D expense, cash, and noncash assets; are unrelated to revenues and SG&A expense; and are negatively related to long-term debt. And in each market, financial statements explain over one-third of the cross-sectional variance in equity values.
Introduction and summary
Much research has shown that financial statements are value relevant in public equity markets-that is, they are associated with the equity values of, and returns to, publicly traded firms (Lev and Ohlson, 1982; Bernard, 1989; Kothari, 2001) . In this study, I break new ground by examining the value relevance of financial statements within private equity markets, and across the transition from private to public equity markets. Both settings are previously unexplored but are economically important in the life of a firm.
Although the value relevance of financial statements within and across equity markets is likely to depend on many factors (such as regulation, liquidity, price-setting mechanisms, and degree of information asymmetry between managers and investors), I focus on the roles played by firms' future investment opportunities, and by the degree of sophistication of the marginal investor in their stock, since both factors have been found to significantly influence publicly traded firms' financial decisions (Smith and Watts, 1992; Gaver and Gaver, 1993) and stock returns (Bernard and Thomas, 1989, 1990; Hand, 1990 ).
The central hypothesis that I develop and test is that the value relevance of financial statements will be a nonlinear 'sawtooth' function of firm maturity when measured within and across private and public equity markets for firms that file to go public. Specifically, I predict that value relevance will rise as a firm matures toward an IPO, fall at the IPO, and then increase again after the IPO. My hypothesis is built on three propositions.
First, I propose that V A /(V A + V FIO ), the fraction of a firm's equity value that comes from its net assets in place V A relative to its future investment opportunities V FIO will be a sawtooth function of firm maturity when measured within and across equity markets for firms that file to go public. decreases at the time of an IPO for two reasons. One, private equity markets can be viewed as tournaments that determine which young firms have the most valuable future investment opportunities. Firms that win the tournament and file to go public will be those whose values of V A /(V A + V FIO ) are the lowest. Two, firms that go public benefit from having their stock traded in a liquid market, thereby removing a private equity illiquidity discount of between 15% and 40%. This will lower V A /(V A + V FIO ) because illiquidity discounts will be more severe for future investment opportunities than for assets in place.
Second, I propose that the probability that the marginal investor in the firm's stock will be financially sophisticated, P soph , will also be a sawtooth function of firm maturity when measured within and across equity markets. The price-setting investor in a private equity market will always be highly sophisticated because the limited partners in private equity funds have strong incentives and deep resources with which to hire the most experienced and financially sophisticated general partners, such as venture capitalists (Gompers and Lerner, 2000) .
However, when a firm undertakes an IPO, it almost always sells some of its stock to unsophisticated retail investors. On average this lowers P soph (or equivalently, lowers the expected level of sophistication of the marginal investor). After the IPO, P soph improves as the firm grows and attracts analyst coverage and institutional shareholders. Moreover, I argue that any tournament-or liquidity-based decline at the IPO in V A /(V A + V FIO ) will be reinforced by mispricing pressure from unsophisticated investors who overestimate the value of the firm by overestimating the intangible V FIO proportionally more than the tangible V A (Miller, 1977; Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam, 1998) .
Third, I suggest that the value relevance of firms' financial statements will be positively related to V A /(V A + V FIO ), and positively related to P soph . To illustrate this, let value relevance be defined as the goodness of fit in a regression of equity value on financial statement data. When the marginal investor is financially sophisticated, equity value will be the rational and efficiently discounted sum of future cash flows attributable to assets in place and future cash flows attributable to future growth opportunities/investments in positive NPV projects (Myers, 1977) .
However, because U.S. GAAP only allows financial statements to record assets in place, not future investment opportunities, value relevance will be increasing in V A /(V A + V FIO ), assuming that assets in place are non-negatively correlated with future investment opportunities. To the extent that the marginal investor in the firm's stock is less than fully financially sophisticated, the value relevance of financial statements will be reduced because the lack of financial sophistication creates equity values that are noisier than they otherwise would be. This noise lowers the value relevance of financial statements because it increases the residual variance of the regression, thereby diminishing the goodness of fit (value relevance) of the regression.
Combining the three propositions above yields the central hypothesis of the paper-that the value relevance of financial statements will be a nonlinear sawtooth function of firm maturity when measured within and across private and public equity markets. Value relevance is predicted to rise as a firm matures toward an IPO, fall at the IPO, and then increase again after the IPO.
I test the sawtooth hypothesis using longitudinal data from 186 U.S. biotechnology companies over the period [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] . Biotech firms are chosen because they have large expected future investment/growth opportunities relative to assets in place; share a similar production function in the R&D-intensive search for new drugs; are typically funded in welldefined stages by organized private equity; and tend to go public quite rapidly. Biotech company pre-money private equity valuations were obtained from Recombinant Capital and those of firms that filed to go public were retained. Pre-money valuations are equity values before accounting for the capital put in by private equity investors in the current funding round.
The resulting set of IPO-conditional private equity valuations were then matched with up to five years of annual pre-IPO financial statements obtained from the IPO filing documents, yielding 458 pairs of private equity valuations plus the preceding fiscal year's financial statements. The pre-IPO valuation points range from Series A funding rounds to Series F funding rounds and beyond. A similar matching procedure was applied to the IPO filing date, where the firm's equity value was defined using the offer price reported in the IPO filing documents (i.e., not including the funds targeted to be raised through the IPO). This yielded 96 pairs of IPO filing equity valuations plus the preceding fiscal year's financial statements.
Finally, three post-IPO public equity market valuations were used, namely three months after each of the first three fiscal years after the IPO. Post-IPO valuations were matched with the preceding fiscal year's financial statements filed with the SEC to yield 441 pairs of post-IPO public equity valuations plus the preceding fiscal year's financial statements.
Pooled and financing round by financing round cross-sectional regressions of equity values on key components of firms' balance sheets and income statements were then conducted.
In those regressions, I find evidence of the predicted sawtooth pattern in the value relevance of financial statements within and across markets. Specifically, I find that the regression adjusted R 2 that is uniquely attributable to financial statements increases as firms mature toward their IPO, declines at the IPO, and increases again after the IPO. I define firm maturity not by the age of the firm per se, but the firm's position in the normal private equity financing sequence (Series A, Series B, etc.) because valuation data is most precisely available at the date of a particular financing round, rather than at any given age of the firm in years since founding. I demonstrate that the sawtooth pattern in adjusted R 2 is not a spurious effect of scale or other factors that can impede comparisons of adjusted R 2 across samples.
Consistent with the proposition that the sawtooth pattern in value relevance stems from underlying sawtooth patterns in the maturing of firms' future investment opportunities and the probability that the marginal investor in firms' stock is sophisticated, I show that the ratio of total assets to the market value of the firm, a commonly used proxy for the importance of the investment opportunity set (Smith and Watts, 1992; Gaver and Gaver, 1993) , increases as firms mature in the private equity market, falls at the IPO filing, and increases after the IPO. A commonly used proxy for the probability that the marginal investor in a firm's stock is sophisticated, the percentage of shares held by institutional shareholders (Hand, 1990; Bartov, Radhakrishnan and Krinsky, 2000; Balsom, Bartov and Marquart, 2002) , increases post-IPO.
In addition to these results, I also find that despite intermarket differences in regulation, liquidity, price-setting mechanisms, and information asymmetry, financial statements are as value relevant in private equity markets as they are in public equity markets. Qualitatively, I
observe that in both types of markets biotech firms' equity values are reliably positively related to R&D expense, cash, and noncash assets; are unrelated to revenues and SG&A expenses; and are negatively related to long-term debt. Quantitatively, financial statements explain over onethird of the cross-sectional variance in biotech equity values in both private and public markets.
In conclusion, this paper contributes to the value relevance literature in several ways. It is the first work to study the associations between financial statement data and the equity values of privately funded companies. In doing so, the paper demonstrates that at least for biotech companies, financial statements are as qualitatively and quantitatively value relevant in private equity markets as they are in public equity markets. Most importantly, the paper develops, tests and finds evidence consistent with the hypothesis that interactions between the maturing of firms' investment opportunity sets and the dynamics of the financial sophistication of the marginal investor create a nonlinear 'sawtooth' pattern in the value relevance of financial statements when measured within and across markets for firms that file to go public. For biotech firms, the value relevance of their financial statements rises as they mature toward an IPO, falls at the IPO, and increases again after the IPO.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the market for private equity and venture capital. Section 3 develops in more detail the hypothesis on which the paper is centered. Section 4 outlines the novel data set created for and used in the study and reports descriptive statistics, while section 5 motivates the regression models and experimental designs employed. Section 6 reports the regression results and the results of several other supporting empirical analyses. Section 7 concludes.
Private equity markets

Institutional background
Private equity markets differ from public equity markets in many ways (Gompers and Lerner, 2000) . For example, public equity markets are highly regulated by the S.E.C. and stock exchanges, while private equity markets are not. Private equity firm valuations are set through face-to-face negotiations between management and a small number of wealthy, professional and risk-tolerant investors. Valuations in a public equity market are set anonymously without direct contact with management through the interactions of large numbers of investors, many of whom are risk-averse and do not have significant wealth or professional investing experience. Public equity markets are highly liquid, while private equity markets are illiquid. Private equity investors can extract management's private information because of their frequent interactions with management and holding of board seats, but public equity investors must rely almost exclusively on public data and face significant information asymmetries.
The private equity market is made up of four submarkets: organized, angel, informal, and Rule 144A (Fenn, Liang and Prowse, 1995) . This paper focuses on organized private equity, defined as unregistered investments in the equity of private companies by professionally managed entities, made either directly by professional investors such as pension funds and endowments, or indirectly by these investors through intermediaries, particularly venture capital partnerships. 1 Funds invested in organized U.S. private equity have grown substantially over the past two decades, rising from $5 billion in 1980 to almost $300 billion in early 2001 (Lerner, 2001) . Private equity funds invest in a wide variety of vehicles and objectives, including young companies, leveraged buyouts, consolidation, mezzanine financing, and distressed debt. Of private equity funds, venture capital partnerships are the most common.
Venture capital
Venture capital is independently managed, dedicated capital invested in young, often startup or early-stage technology businesses that are highly risky but also have very strong future growth and profit potential (Gompers and Lerner, 2000) . Venture capital funds are usually structured as partnerships of venture capitalists that raise money in staged amounts from wealthy private investors, companies and institutions. A fund usually has a ten-year life and invests in a portfolio of private companies, often restricted to one or two sectors such as biotechnology or software. Although venture capitalists put up only about 1% of the limited partnership's capital, they manage the fund through their role as general partners. In exchange for finding, screening, and deciding upon the companies to invest in, venture capitalists are paid an annual management fee that is usually between 1.5% and 3% of the fund's committed capital or net asset value, and they receive about 20% of the profits made by the fund's investments.
The typical investment made by a venture capitalist is in illiquid preferred stock that is only convertible into liquid common stock or cash at one of two major exit points: either an IPO or the sale of the company to another entity. This usually occurs within a targeted window of a certain number of years. Although venture capitalists often provide a firm a measure of longterm financing by investing in several financing rounds, they also provide business expertise and connections. The venture capitalist usually serves on the firm's board of directors; provides the entrepreneur with financial sophistication, operating services, and a network of business contacts; helps recruit key personnel; and imparts financial and strategic discipline.
Research into venture capital has blossomed over the past decade as researchers have 1 Angel private equity consists of investments made by wealthy individuals, typically arranged by matchmakers such as lawyers and accountants. Informal private equity is similar to angel capital except that firms sell unregistered equity securities to both institutional investors and wealthy individuals across a larger number of such investors. Rule 144A private equity is underwritten private equity offerings under the SEC's Rule 144A, which establishes the rules and conditions under which private securities are permitted to be traded among certain classes of institutional investors (Fenn, Liang and Prowse, 1995) .
exploited the fact that venture capitalists face many of the same problems as public investors, but to a more extreme degree (Lerner, 2000 (Lerner, , 2001 ). An excellent summary is provided by Gompers and Lerner (2000), spanning topics such as the compensation of venture capitalists (Gompers and Lerner, 1999) ; the optimal investment, monitoring and staging of venture capital (Gompers, 1995) ; the decision to go public (Lerner, 1994a) ; and the long-run performance of venturebacked IPOs (Brav and Gompers, 1997) . Kaplan and Stromberg (2002a, b) empirically relate the characteristics of venture capital contracts to theories of financial contracting.
3.
The 'sawtooth' hypothesis
Dynamics of the investment opportunity set
The value of a firm's equity, V, can be broken into two parts: the present value of net assets in place, V A , and the present value of future profitable investment/growth opportunities, V FIO (Miller and Modigliani, 1961) . As noted by Myers (1977) , growth opportunities are the real options that a firm has or may create to make future investments that earn a rate of return in excess of its opportunity cost of capital. Such growth opportunities are frequently referred to as the firm's investment opportunity set and have been shown to be an important determinant of many corporate decisions (Adam and Goyal, 2003) . For example, the relative mix of assets in place versus future investment opportunities affects a firm's accounting policies (Skinner, 1993) , capital structure (Myers, 1977; Smith and Watts, 1992) , compensation contracts (Smith and Watts, 1992; Gaver and Gaver, 1993) , and dividend policy (Smith and Watts, 1992) .
I propose that for firms that file to go public, the fraction of their total equity value that comes from assets in place relative to future investment opportunities will be a sawtooth function of firm maturity when measured within and across equity markets. In figure 1 balance-sheet assets in place (Myers, 1977, p.151 , 1998 ). This will lower V A /(V A + V FIO ) because the illiquidity discount will likely be more severe for the firm's future investment opportunities than for its assets in place, since there are more liquid markets for the latter than the former.
Alternatively, a private equity market can be viewed as a tournament to determine which young firms have the most promising investment opportunities. The prize for "winning" is that public equity markets provide the winners with the large amounts of capital needed to convert their intangible investment opportunities into tangible cash flows (and perhaps also an increase in firm value through a lower cost of capital). The cost, however, is dilution through having to share their future cash flows with public investors. Firms that file to go public are those that underwriters, in their capacity as expert screeners and across-market agents for public investors, determine to have the most valuable investment opportunities. As a result, unless there is no uncertainty as to which privately funded firms have the best investment opportunities (and therefore which firms will win the private equity market tournament), firms that file to go public will have values of V A /(V A + V FIO ) that are lower than both the average of all firms that could have been taken public, and their own historical V A /(V A + V FIO ).
Probability that the marginal investor in a firm's stock is financially sophisticated
Traditionally, research in finance has assumed that rational and sophisticated investors set security prices. Over the past 15 years, however, the field of behavioral finance has emerged to challenge this traditional assumption. In broad terms, behavioral finance argues that some financial phenomena can be better understood using models in which some investors are less than fully rational (Barberis and Thaler, 2002; Daniel, Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2002) .
Accounting research, which has both borrowed from and contributed to behavioral finance, has characterized imperfect rationality as a lack of sophistication in understanding financial statements. For example, Bernard and Thomas (1990) suggest that investors do not fully understand the time-series properties of quarterly EPS. Hand (1990) finds evidence that the probability that the marginal investor reacts to stale income statement information depends on how financially sophisticated he or she is. Bartov, Radhakrishnan and Krinsky (2000) suggest that the trading activity of unsophisticated investors underlies the predictability of stock returns after earnings announcements. Balsom, Bartov and Marquart (2002) report that unsophisticated investors recognize earnings management by firms more slowly than do sophisticated investors.
In this study, I hypothesize that P soph , the probability that the marginal investor will be financially sophisticated will be a key determinant of the value relevance of historical financial statements for two reasons. First, arriving at an unbiased and efficient expectation of the value of future cash flows from assets in place and investment opportunities requires a sophisticated understanding of financial accounting. I propose that the price-setting investor in private equity markets will always be highly sophisticated because the limited partners in private equity funds have strong incentives and deep resources with which to hire the most experienced and financially sophisticated general partners, such as venture capitalists (see fig. 1 ). However, when a firm undertakes an IPO, it will almost always sell some of its stock to unsophisticated individual investors. On average, this lowers P soph (or equivalently, lowers the expected level of sophistication of the marginal investor). After the IPO, P soph will improve as the firm grows and attracts analyst coverage and long-term institutional shareholders.
The second role played by P soph in determining the value relevance of financial statements is that of reinforcing the tournament effect described in section 3.1. I suggest that any tournament-or liquidity-based decline at the IPO in V A /(V A + V FIO ) will be reinforced by mispricing pressure from unsophisticated investors who overestimate the value of the firm by overestimating the intangible V FIO proportionally more than the tangible V A . Prior research lends support to this proposition. For example, Miller (1977) shows that investors who demand shares offered in an IPO are likely to be those that are most optimistic about the firm's prospects. Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2003) find that over the period 1980-1997, the median IPO is overvalued at the offer price by between 14% and 50% and that this overvaluation arises because, in a manner consistent with the investor overconfidence theory of Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) , financially unsophisticated investors place too much weight on forecasts of future revenue and earnings growth and pay too little attention to current profitability. 3 Yetman (2003) finds that periods of high investor sentiment are associated with less rational and less efficient use of accounting information at IPOs. Shiller (1990) reports that only about one-quarter of respondents in a large survey undertook any fundamental analysis when evaluating whether or not to invest in firms going public.
Value relevance of historical financial statements within and across equity markets
Financial statements are value relevant if they are reliably associated with equity prices or returns. I arrive at the hypothesis that the value relevance of financial statements will rise as firms matures toward an IPO, fall at the IPO, and then increase again after the IPO by proposing that value relevance is positively related to V A /(V A + V FIO ) and positively related to P soph . These propositions convert the sawtooth relations between the maturing of the firm's future investment opportunities (section 3.1) and the dynamics of probability that the marginal investor will be sophisticated (section 3.2) into a sawtooth pattern between value relevance and firm maturity.
To illustrate, let value relevance be defined as the adjusted R 2 in a regression of equity values on financial statement data. If the marginal investor is financially sophisticated, then equity value, the dependent variable in the regression, will be the rational and efficiently discounted sum of future cash flows attributable to assets in place and future cash flows attributable to future investments in positive NPV projects (Myers, 1977) . U.S. GAAP only allows financial statements to record assets in place, not future investment opportunities.
Therefore, if assets in place are (as seems reasonable to suppose) non-negatively correlated with future investment opportunities, then value relevance will be increasing in the size of a firm's assets in place relative to its future investment opportunities. In addition, to the extent that the marginal investor is not financially sophisticated, equity values will be noisier, the regression adjusted R 2 worse, and the value relevance of financial statements less.
Data
In this section I describe the construction and characteristics of a novel database that combines private equity valuations and relevant financial statement data. Because the database consists entirely of biotech firms, I begin with a brief explanation of biotechnology and economic research into the business of biotechnology.
Biotechnology
Biotechnology is the application of technology to the life sciences, wherein living cells or their processes are used to solve problems and to perform specific industrial or manufacturing processes. Biotech applications include the production of drugs, synthetic hormones and bulk foodstuffs, the bioconversion of organic waste, and the use of genetically altered bacteria.
Biotech firms are highly dependent on the intellectual property (ideas, discoveries, patents) generated through their large R&D expenditures, and as such are among the most intangibleintensive of businesses. The value chain of the typical biotech firm stretches some 10-15 years from founding through patenting to successful FDA approval and product sales ( fig. 2 ). Biotech is therefore a very risky but potentially very lucrative equity investment.
I choose the biotechnology sector to test the sawtooth hypothesis described in section 3 because biotech firms have large investment opportunity sets, share a similar production function in the R&D-intensive search for new drugs, and are usually funded in well-defined stages by organized private equity. The typical young biotech firm is in an intense R&D race against competitors to discover and patent a new drug. As such, it has large capital needs over a long period of time. In the early stages of its life, capital needs are met by private equity, usually in the form of venture capital and strategic investments from big pharmaceutical companies.
However, capital needs quickly become so large that they can only be satisfied through an IPO or a merger with a big pharmaceutical company. Successful biotech firms therefore tend to go public very rapidly, and it is not uncommon for a biotech firm's S-1 filing with the S.E.C. to contain financial statement data that span its entire life. As the biotech sector has been in existence for some 30 years, this has led to a steady stream of young, start-up biotech firms as well as more mature biotech firms that are going, and have gone, public.
Economic research into biotechnology has spanned three areas: intellectual human capital Darby, 1996, 1998; Zucker, Darby and Brewer, 1998) , strategic alliances (Robinson and Stuart, 2000) , and valuation (Stuart, Hoang and Hybels, 1999; Nicholson, Danzon and McCullough, 2002; Darby, Liu and Zucker, 1999) . In accounting, Joos (2002) finds that the level and rate of growth in R&D expense, R&D success, and competitive structure all help explain cross-sectional variation in market-to-book ratios for pharmaceutical drug manufacturers that operated in the pharmaceutical preparation industry over the period 1975 -1998 . Ely, Simko and Thomas (2003 conclude that the average stage at which a firm's portfolio of drugs resides significantly conditions the value relevance of the firm's R&D expenditures. Guo, Lev and Zhou (2003) find that biotech firms' disclosures affect their bid-ask spreads and stock return volatility.
Finally, Hand (2003a) finds that balance sheet, income statement and statement of cash flows data explain cross-sectional variance in biotech firms' post-IPO equity market values, and that the mapping of biotech firms' R&D expenditures into equity market value is a function of the location of R&D in the biotech value chain of discovery, development and commercialization, as well as the growth rate in R&D spending.
Sample selection, equity valuations and financial statement data
The private equity market data used in this study are integrated from two sources. The starting point is a set of pre-IPO pre-money valuations purchased from Recombinant Capital (www.Recap.com). Recap has collected what it indicates is a full set of round-by-round financings for over 600 biotech companies that begins in the early 1980s. Pre-money are used rather than post-money valuations because pre-money valuations are independent of the amount invested in the firm during the current financing round (Lerner, 1994b) .
For those firms in Recap's database that filed to go public, I obtained financial statement data from S-1 and 424B documents available online at www.sec.gov. In doing so, I exploit the fact that when a firm files to go public, it has to provide five years' worth of audited (albeit coarse) historical financial statement data. Then, on a firm-by firm basis, each year's financial statement data was matched with the first pre-money valuation following the fiscal year-end, as long as the valuation date was less than a year beyond the fiscal year-end (see fig. 3 ).
Equity valuations and financial statement data at and after the IPO filing were obtained from sources including www.siliconinvestor.com and www.sec.gov. In addition to the IPO filing, I used three post-IPO valuation dates, namely three months after the first, second and third fiscal year-ends following the IPO offering date (if an IPO occurred, since not all biotech firms in the sample that filed to go public successfully accomplished an offering). These post-IPO equity valuations, the latest of which is on 3/31/03, were matched with firms' financial statements from the preceding fiscal year, the latest of which is 12/31/02. I required that a firm's cash balance, SG&A expense, and R&D expense be positive for the financial statement data to be usable. 4 The results of the sample selection process were 458 valid firm-year pre-IPO observations, 96 at-IPO observations, and 441 post-IPO observations covering 186 biotech firms over the period 1992-2003.
The strengths of this database are that it is large; not unduly clustered in time; it is rich in financial statement data; and it contains a wide variety of longitudinal financing points (Series A through Series F and beyond, successful and unsuccessful IPO filings, and post-IPO equity valuations). The weaknesses of the database are twofold. First, all of the IPOs filed are filed between 9/29/95 and 12/14/01, which is only a six-year period. This period could be lengthened, but at the significant cost of purchasing hard copy S-1 or 424B documents from commercial data sources. Second, the database does not contain private equity valuations or financial statement data for firms that did not file to go public because they went bankrupt, merged, or chose to remain private. While not filing to go public is not synonymous with failure, it is likely more associated with failure than is going public. Thus, if financial statement data are more value relevant for companies that succeed than those that fail, the fact that the private equity database is restricted to those firms that filed to go public may result in an upward bias in the measured pre-IPO value relevance of accounting information. Moreover, if the impact of selection bias is larger the further away is the valuation date from the IPO filing selection date, then the bias will be larger the earlier is the valuation date in the firm's life. These sample selection issues may therefore work to simultaneously increase the intercept and decrease the slope of the pre-IPO portion of V A /(V A + V FIO ), the fraction of equity value that comes from net assets in place relative to future investment opportunities (fig 4.) . If so, then the empirical tests will be biased in favor of finding that accounting is value relevant in private equity markets, particularly in a firm's earliest financing rounds [because the average pre-IPO-measured value relevance of V A /(V A + V FIO ) will be higher], but biased against finding that value relevance increases as a function of firm maturity within the private equity market (because the slope is lower). Table 1 lists and defines the variables used in the study. There is a significant amount of valuation information contained in, and/or computable from, Recap's private equity market valuation database (panel A). The public equity market data is standard (panel B). There is a large amount of pre-IPO accounting information reported in the S-1 and 424B documents that firms file with the SEC when they register to go public (panels C and D). (Zucker, Darby and Brewer, 1998) . organized from left to right in the normal sequence followed by a firm funded by private equity, beginning with the Series A round and culminating in the IPO filing. OTHER financings are financings that were not explicitly identified by Recap as being "Series A," "Series B," etc.
Descriptive statistics
Such valuations occur anywhere in the firm's pre-IPO life, whereas Series C financings always follow Series B financings, etc. 7 Although all firms follow the Series A, B, C, etc. sequence, some go public as early as after their Series A round, while others go public after their Series G or H round. Some firms file to go public but end up withdrawing their registration.
As would be expected, the time between a firm's founding and when it undertakes a particular financing round (AGE) increases as the funding Series increases. 8 The median gap between the financing date on which the pre-money valuation is established and the end of the previous fiscal year from which the financial statement data is taken is less than five months, and is smallest for Series A and largest for the IPO. This helps mitigate the concerns that financial statement data is stale by the time the firm's current round of financing is undertaken, and is staler the earlier the round. It is also the case that pre-money valuations, the capital raised, the firm's cash balance, and its revenues and R&D expenditures all increase from Series A to IPO, though at what appear to be decreasing rates.
6 Untabulated analysis reveals that this skewness is also present at each financing round, as well as in the pooled data reported in table 3. 7 OTHER valuation points include investments of common equity, private placements, and debt-related financing such as bridge and convertible notes. 8 One exception is that the median AGE of Series B financings is slightly less than that of Series A financings. Closer examination of this anomaly indicated that this was not due to data errors, but arose by chance because the procedure by which valuations and financial statement data are combined does not guarantee that AGE will be increasing in the Series level. It is also the case that sometimes a firm's first financing is labeled as Series B.
Table 4 also reveals that round-to-round returns earned by equity holders decline from 67% at the Series B round to 28% at Series E and 3% at Series ≥ F. The declining trend is broken by the very large 86% median return that is in theory earnable by equity holders at the IPO filing. The 86% figure is consistent with the sawtooth proposition advanced in section 3.1 that predicts that firms that file to go public will experience a decrease in V A /(V A + V FIO ).
Although an increase in equity value does not necessitate a decrease in V A /(V A + V FIO ), because V A could increase proportionately more than V FIO , it seems more likely that the lion's share of any increase in the equity values of intangible-intensive young biotech firms in the round prior to their filing for an IPO will come from an increase in the value of their investment opportunities rather than their actual assets in place.
Regression methods
This section defines the value relevance of financial statements, explains why components of firms' financial statements rather than book equity and net income are used to determine value relevance, and explains why a log-linear specification is employed as the main regression model.
Value relevance
Financial statements are said to be value relevant if they are reliably associated with equity prices or returns. Following many other studies, I define the degree of the value relevance of financial statements using the adjusted R 2 statistic-specifically, the adjusted R 2 that can be uniquely attributed to financial statements in a regression of equity values on financial statement data and control variables. 9 However, mindful of the inferential dangers of comparing adjusted R 2 s across samples (Goldberger, 1971; Brown, Lo and Lys, 1999; Gu, 2002) , I conduct auxiliary analyses to test whether such dangers are significant in my setting. I conclude that they are not.
Financial statement data used as explanatory variables
The regressions that I estimate model firms' equity values as a function of the major components of their book equity and net income rather than their book equity and net income per 9 Studies by Harris, Lang and Moller (1994), Collins, Maydew and Weiss (1997) , Francis and Schipper (1999) , Lev and Zarowin (1999) , and Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000) all use adjusted R 2 to measure value relevance.
se. Zhang (2000) Hand suggests that one solution to the problem of distorted relations between equity values and aggregate financial statement data for intangible intensive firms is to replace book equity and net income with their key components-individual or major categories of assets, liabilities, revenues, and expenses. This substitution prevents the associations between intangible assets/expenses and equity value from contaminating the associations between tangible assets/expenses and equity value. In essence, using individual financial statement data items rather than aggregated book equity and net income removes the restriction that the accounting for all assets, liabilities, revenues, and expenses be equally biased or unbiased. For example, U.S.
GAAP requires that R&D be expensed even though economically it is an asset (Lev and Sougiannis, 1996) . As a result, if R&D expense is forced into the computation of net income, the coefficient on net income will be a blend of a positive marginal association between R&D and equity value arising from R&D being an asset, and a negative marginal association between cost of sales or other true expenses and equity value. I therefore use the components approach because young biotech firms make highly intensive and rapidly growing investments in R&D and therefore have significantly biased financial statements.
The balance sheet data used are three primary components of total shareholder equitycash, noncash assets, and long-term debt. The definitions of assets and liabilities and the relations observed between assets, liabilities, and firms' equity values in public markets lead to the expectation that the coefficients on cash and noncash assets in both the private and the public equity markets will be positive and that the coefficient on long-term debt will be negative. The income statement data used are the main components of net income for biotech firms-revenues, cost of sales, SG&A costs, and R&D expense. I expect to observe a positive coefficient on revenues to the extent that revenues are not entirely transitory, and a positive coefficient on R&D because the bulk of the benefits from R&D emerge in future periods. I expect to observe a negative coefficient on cost of sales, recognizing that because cost of sales is only recorded for product sales and young biotech firms recognize revenues from several sources beyond product sales (collaborations, contracts, grants, licenses, and research), few firms will report positive cost of sales. I make no sign prediction on SG&A because SG&A is a mixture of period expenses that would be expected to be negatively related to equity value such as the rent on the firm's facilities, and costs that provide future benefits such as salaries for senior management and key scientific personnel that would be expected to be positively related to equity value.
In addition to financial statement items, most regressions include indicator variables covering the major financing rounds that are identified in the Recap database (Series A through Series ≥F, and OTHER), and the years 1992-2001. The financing round indicators help mitigate the potential selection bias arising from the fact that only firms that file for an IPO are included in the sample (see section 4.3) because selection bias is likely to be more severe across rounds rather than within rounds. Financing round indicators also help control for discount rates that decline as firms mature (table 4) . Year indicators control for time-dependent economy-wide interest rates and other macroeconomic factors.
Regression models
The economics and accounting of biotech companies are likely to differ substantially from the assumptions made in equity valuation models such as Ohlson (1995) . For example, the Ohlson (1995) model assumes that accounting is unbiased. This is certainly not the case for biotech firms (see table 3), and Zhang's model of equity valuation when accounting is conservative predicts that there will be nonlinearities in the relations between equity values and financial statement data. In addition, although the Ohlson model does not per se rule out positive future NPV opportunities (Ohlson, 2000) , neither does it accommodate firms' investment opportunity sets in any clear-cut manner. As firms' investment opportunity sets are by definition real options (Myers, 1977) , any relations between current financial statement data and firms' investment opportunity sets will likely be nonlinear.
Because of the high likelihood of nonlinearities between equity values and financial statements, my main empirical tests employ a log-linear regression specification. I subsequently show that inferences reached using a log-linear model are robust to alternative regression specifications, including rank regressions. A log-linear model between equity value and financial statement data implies that a firm's pre-log equity value is a Cobb-Douglas type production function of its pre-log financial statement data. Although log-linear models have been employed extensively in economics, particularly for valuing R&D (Hall, 1993 (Hall, , 2000 Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2001 ), they are rare in accounting and finance. 10 In addition to accommodating nonlinearities, log-linear models are econometrically robust because the log transforming of the dependent and independent variables substantially dampens the influence of anomalous observations or outliers, and typically yields a greater degree of homoscedasticity in regression residuals. 11 These are significant concerns for biotech firms because biotech firms'
equity market values, net income, R&D, revenues, etc. are highly skewed (table 3) .
The regression models include financial statement data from only the most recent fiscal year immediately prior to the valuation date. Including earlier financial statement data and/or instruments for expected future net cash flows, particularly as the firm matures and more years of historical financial statement data exists, could expand such a simplistic view. However, I limit myself to financial statement data for the year immediately preceding the valuation date for reasons of parsimony and data availability: past financial statement data are highly correlated with current financial statement data, and direct measures of expected future net cash flows such as analyst forecasts are unavailable for pre-IPO firms.
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Each variable Z in the log-linear regressions is transformed using: LZ = log e [Z + 1] if Z ≥ 0, where Z is expressed in $000s.
Equation (1) is information-preserving in the sense of being monotone and one-to-one. The addition of $1,000 to Z ensures that LZ is zero when Z is zero. Negative values of Z do not arise 10 Kaplan and Ruback (1995) and Berger, Ofek and Swary (1996) are two infrequent instances of the use of loglinear models in valuation contexts in finance. Nicholson, Danzon and McCullough (2002) explore the impact of deals on biotech venture capital and IPO valuations using a log-linear model, as do Stuart, Hoang and Hybels (1999) in their examination of the impact of interorganizational networks on growth and valuation. In the accounting arena, Ye and Finn (2000) motivate a log-linear model of firms' equity market values, book equity and net income by demonstrating that if the log of one plus the return on equity follows an AR(1) process, and net dividends are zero, then equity market value emerges as a multiplicative function of book equity and net income. Beatty, Riffe and Thompson (2001) derive a log-linear valuation model under the assumptions that stock valuation is first degree homogenous in underlying valuation drivers, that accounting constructs measure such valuation drivers with multiplicative measurement error that is conditionally lognormal, and that the unconditional distribution of stock values is either diffuse or lognormal. 11 To finesse the reasonable concern that a minority of the data drives the magnitude and/or significance of parameter estimates, most researchers who apply OLS regression to nonlogged data first identify and then winsorize or delete outliers. This potentially ad hoc process is all but unnecessary within a log-linear model because the log transformation dramatically dampens the values of previously extreme observations. 12 Untabulated tests indicate that lagged financial statement data are rarely incrementally associated with current period equity values.
in this study. Unreported statistics indicate that the log transformation dramatically reduces the right-skewness of the raw data shown in table 3, and achieves greater homoscedasticity in the regression residuals relative to most models that are not log-linear (e.g., ranks of non-log transformed data also achieve more homoscedasticity in regression residuals).
Empirical tests
This section reports the results of a series of empirical tests. I begin by estimating regressions in which all available observations are pooled within a given market. This provides a high-level assessment of the value relevance of biotech firms' financial statements in private and public equity markets. I then directly test the sawtooth hypothesis by estimating value relevance regressions financing round by financing round as firms mature within and across markets, being careful to address the inferential dangers inherent in comparing adjusted R 2 s across samples.
The section concludes with tests of the propositions that the underlying drivers of the sawtooth hypothesis-the fraction of equity attributable to future investment opportunities, and the probability that the marginal investor in the firm's stock is financially sophisticated-are themselves sawtooth functions of firm maturity.
Univariate correlations
As background, table 5 reports the Pearson correlations between firms' log-transformed pre-IPO pre-money valuations LPREMV and financial statement data (panel A, n = 458), and firms' log-transformed post-IPO equity market values LMVE and financial statement data (panel B, n = 441). Table 5 includes all available observations pooled across private equity financing rounds and public equity end-of-fiscal-year dates, except for IPO filing observations (n = 96).
The correlations indicate that both private and public equity values are reliably highly positively correlated with firms' cash assets, noncash assets, long-term debt, revenues, SG&A expenses, and R&D costs. There are also high correlations among several accounting items. Three models are estimated for each type of market. Models 1 and 4 are the primary regressions, in which the dependent variables are LPREMV and LMVE, respectively, and the financial statement independent variables are log transformed per equation (1) of section 5.3.
Regressions estimated using observations that are pooled within a given market
Models 2-3 and 5-6 report the results of specification checks where unscaled and nonparametric regressions are estimated on the same data as models 1 and 4. In models 2 and 5 the dependent and independent variables are as reported (i.e., are not log transformed), and in models 3 and 6 the dependent and independent variables are the ranks of the data used in models 2 and 5.
From models 1 and 4, it can be seen that firms' equity values are related to financial statements in very similar ways in private and public markets. First, untabulated tests of the equality of the estimated coefficients (elasticities) on financial statement variables in these two models indicate that of the 12 estimated coefficients on financial statement data, only the coefficient on cash differs across markets, being reliably higher in public equity markets (p-value < 0.01). Second, conforming to economic expectations, firms' equity values are reliably positively related to their most recent fiscal year-end cash balances, noncash assets and R&D spending in both models 1 and 4. The strong significance of the coefficients on R&D and cash is consistent with the prominence that biotech venture capitalists accord to R&D and cash in both the survivability and success of biotech firms. The estimated coefficients on cash, noncash assets and R&D are also very similar in size across markets.
Third, equity values are not significantly related to revenues, most likely because of the somewhat transitory nature of many biotech revenues. Few biotech companies generate substantial amounts of recurring product revenues until their drugs have passed through the FDA hurdles, which can be as much as 15 years into the life of a biotech firm (see fig. 1 ). Instead, young biotech firms generate revenues from fixed-period collaborations, contracts, grants, licenses, and research. One result of the paucity of product sales is that only a minority of firms has a cost of sales, which perhaps accounts for the lack of significance on the coefficient on cost of sales.
Fourth, SG&A expense is not reliably related to firms' equity values. I suggest that this is likely because SG&A contains a mixing of period expenses that would be expected to be negatively related to equity value, such as the rent on the firm's facilities, and costs that provide future benefits, such as salaries for senior management and key scientific personnel, that would be expected to be positively related to equity value.
Finally, conforming to economic expectations, firms' equity values are reliably negatively related to long-term debt. The reliably negative coefficient on long-term debt dampens the potential criticism that the positive coefficients observed on cash, noncash assets, revenues and R&D are illusory or overstated because such variables merely capture scale effects (Christie, 1987; Barth and Kallapur, 1996; Lo and Lys, 2000) . Were that criticism valid, the positive univariate correlations between equity values and long-term debt (table 5, panels A and B) would be likely to lead to positive coefficients on long-term debt, not the reliably negative coefficients observed in models 1 and 4.
The inferences obtained from estimating log-linear regressions (models 1 and 4) are generally robust to estimating unscaled regressions (models 2 and 5) and rank regressions (models 3 and 6). For example, of the 24 regression coefficients in models 2-3 plus models 5-6, only those on long-term debt in model 2 and SG&A in model 5 are different from those obtained in the log-linear regressions. In model 2, the estimated coefficient on long-term debt is not reliably negative (while it is in models 1 and 3-6), and in model 5 the estimated coefficient on SG&A is reliably negative (while it is insignificantly different from zero in models 1-4 and 6).
Examination of the regression diagnostics for models 2 and 5 indicates that these differences arise from the undue influence of a few outliers. Untabulated supplementary regressions also
show that the results reported in table 6 are robust to redefining the dependent variable as equity value less the amount of cash on hand, or as equity value less the book value of equity, and restricting private equity observations to those for which the financing round was led by venture capital investors.
Regressions estimated on a financing-round-by-financing-round basis
The central hypothesis of this paper is that sawtooth dynamics in the maturing of firms' investment opportunity sets and in the financial sophistication of the marginal investor in firms' stock combine to create a sawtooth pattern in the value relevance of financial statement data within and across private and public equity markets (see fig. 1 ). Specifically, the value relevance of financial statements is predicted to rise as a firm matures toward an IPO, fall at the IPO, and then increase again after the IPO. Table 7 reports the results of maturity-based regressions that directly test this hypothesis.
Firm maturity is measured in private equity markets by financing round, and in public equity markets in yearly intervals beginning three months after the end of the fiscal year following the IPO. 13 I refer to these maturity-based regressions as round-by-round regressions. Compared to pooled regressions, I expect round-by-round regressions to mitigate the impacts of selection bias (if any), because round-by-round regressions control for a key factor associated with the likelihood of filing for an IPO, namely the firm's age (Cochrane, 2001 Revenues, cost of sales, and SG&A were therefore not included in the round-by-round analysis.
Results of untabulated regressions that include these variables indicate that they are only infrequently significantly different from zero, in contrast to the variables included in table 7.
Several of table 7's regression results deserve highlighting. First, consistent with the sawtooth hypothesis, the value relevance of financial statements, as measured by the adjusted R 2 that is uniquely attributable to financial statements, increases as firms mature toward an IPO, falls at the IPO, and then increases again after the IPO. Figure 4 visually depicts this result.
Second, the sawtooth in value relevance does not appear to be due to scale or sampling variation.
If the sawtooth in value relevance were due to scale, then value relevance should be positively correlated with the coefficient of variation in the scale factor, such as LPREM, LMVE, or LCASH Lys, 1999, 2002) . However, the Spearman correlations between the adjusted R 2 that is uniquely attributable to financial statements and {LPREM, LMVE} and LCASH are 0.04 (one-tailed p-value > 0.90) and -0.42 (one-tailed p-value = 0.11), respectively.
Alternatively, if the pattern in value relevance were due to the sample variances of the financial 13 As a result, table 7 only includes private equity observations that were explicitly identified in the Recap database as being "Series A," "Series B," etc. 14 Evidence that risk varies systematically with firm maturity is found in table 4, where the round-by-round returns earned by equity holders declines monotonically from 67% at the Series A round to 3% at the Series ≥F round. 15 In addition, parsimony led me to not include LLTD or year indicators in the Series A round regression. statement variables, then value relevance should be positively correlated with the standard deviation of the regression residuals (Gu, 2002) . However, the Spearman correlation between the adjusted R 2 that is uniquely attributable to financial statements and the standard deviations of round-by-round regression residuals is -0.14 (one-tailed p-value > 0.50).
Third, as measured by the p-values on the F-statistics that test the hypothesis that the coefficients on all four financial statement variables are zero, financial statements are value relevant at every stage of the firm's life after founding, even at the earliest, or Series A, financing round, where the p-value of the F-statistic is 0.03. However, as indicated in section 4.2, there may be a selection bias at work, because the dataset does not contain private equity valuations or financial statement data for firms that did not file to go public.
The same caveat applies to the fourth result of note in table 7, namely the finding that financial statements explain over one-third of the cross-sectional variance in equity values in each market. The average adjusted R 2 that is uniquely attributable to financial statements is 40%
in private equity markets versus 35% in public equity markets. However, if there is a selectionbased upward bias in value relevance at work, then the average value relevance of financial statements in private equity markets as measured by my dataset will be upward biased.
Fifth, there is evidence that the sawtooth pattern in value relevance stems from sawtooth dynamics in both the maturing of firms' future investment opportunities, and in the probability that the marginal investor in firms' stock is sophisticated. To assess the maturing of firms' investment opportunities, I employ a commonly used proxy for the relative importance of the investment opportunity set, namely TA/(EV + LTD), the ratio of total assets to the market value of the firm (Smith and Watts, 1992; Gaver and Gaver, 1993) . 16 The second to last row of table 7
shows that the median value of TA/(EV + LTD) increases while the firm is in the private equity market, declines at the IPO filing, and increases to a higher level after the IPO. Moreover, the Spearman correlation between the adjusted R 2 that is uniquely attributable to financial statements and the median value of TA/(EV + LTD) is 0.63 (one-tailed p-value = 0.03).
Testing for the presence of a sawtooth in the probability that the marginal investor in firms' stock is sophisticated is harder because of a lack of data, particularly prior to the IPO.
16 Adam and Goyal (2003) evaluate four proxies for a firm's investment opportunity set: the market-to-book assets ratio, the market-to-book equity ratio, the earnings-price ratio, and the ratio of capital expenditures to the net book value of PP&E. They conclude that the market-to-book assets ratio is the best variable to proxy for investment opportunities. Based on this, I use (the inverse of) the market-to-book assets ratio as my proxy.
One piece of information that becomes available once the firm begins to trade publicly is the percentage of shares held by institutional shareholders. This variable that has been used in several studies as a proxy for the probability that the marginal investor in a firm's stock is sophisticated (Hand, 1990; Bartov, Radhakrishnan and Krinsky, 2000; Balsom, Bartov and Marquart, 2002) . I report the median percentage of shares held by institutions in the last row of table 7. Consistent with the prediction that the probability of a sophisticated marginal investor rises as the firm matures within the public equity markets, the median percentage of shares held by institutions increases from 0.22 to 0.28 to 0.31 over the three years following the IPO.
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Finally, I note that the value relevance of financial statements at the IPO filing, as measured by the adjusted R 2 that is uniquely attributable to financial statements, is a mere 12%, lower even than the 19% observed at the Series A financing round. This is consistent with the view that unsophisticated investors lower the value relevance of financial statements at the IPO point, reinforcing the simultaneous decline in value relevance arising from the increase in the importance of firms' future investment opportunities (see section 3.3). The low value relevance of biotech firms' financial statements at their IPO is consistent with the results of Kim and Ritter (1999) , who find that valuing IPOs in general on the basis of the price-to-historical-earnings, price-to-historical-sales and market-to-book ratios of comparable firms is of very limited use.
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Caveats and limitations of the paper
Beyond the standard concern of how well the results found here for biotech firms generalize to the population of private firms, this paper has three main limitations-differences between private and public equity markets that have not been controlled for, the uncertain impacts of selection bias, and the exclusion of nonfinancial variables.
Private equity markets differ from public equity markets along many dimensions. The focus of this paper-the first research in the area-has been on the investment opportunity set and the sophistication of the marginal investor. However, other factors such as regulation, liquidity, price-setting mechanisms, and degree of information asymmetry between managers 17 The median of 0.28 two years after the IPO is reliably larger than the median of 0.22 one year after the IPO (Wilcoxon p-value < 0.01). The median of 0.31 three years after the IPO is not reliably larger than the median of 0.28 one year after the IPO (Wilcoxon p-value = 0.47). 18 In univariate regressions of IPO firms' price-to-historical-earnings, price-to-historical-sales and market-to-book ratios on the median price-to-historical-earnings, price-to-historical-sales and market-to-book ratios of comparable firms, Kim and Ritter (1999, table 4) report adjusted R 2 of between 5% and 8.5% and mean absolute valuation errors of between 31% and 52%. and investors differ across private and public equity markets and are therefore likely to affect the value relevance of financial statements. Selection bias arises because private equity valuations are only included in the study if the firm is successful enough to file for an IPO. I attempted to control for this by estimating round-by-round regressions, since the likelihood of a firm filing for an IPO increases with its age (Cochrane, 2001) . In terms of nonfinancial information, I chose not to collect and include data such as the number of patents held by the firm, the stages of the firm's patents through the FDA approval process, or the quality of the firm's key scientists, simply because of the very high costs involved. As such, I cannot rule out the possibility that the inferences I have drawn regarding the value relevance of financial statement data are overstated because the financial statement data are acting as proxies for the more value relevant nonfinancial information. Addressing all three limitations just discussed remains a promising avenue for future research.
Conclusions
This study has contributed to the value relevance literature by examining the value relevance of financial statements within private equity markets, and across the transition from private to public equity markets. Both settings previously unexamined but are economically important stages in the life of a firm. My results demonstrate that, at least for biotech companies, financial statements are as qualitatively and quantitatively value relevant in private equity markets as they are in public equity markets. In each market, equity values are positively related to R&D expense, cash, and noncash assets; unrelated to revenues and SG&A expense; and negatively related to long-term debt. And in each market, financial statements explain over onethird of the cross-sectional variance in equity values in each market.
Most importantly, the paper developed, tested and found evidence supportive of the hypothesis that interactions between the maturing of firms' investment opportunity sets and the dynamics of the probability that the marginal investor is sophisticated create a nonlinear 'sawtooth' pattern in the value relevance of financial statements measured within and across markets. For firms that file to go public, the value relevance of their financial statements as predicted rises as firms mature toward an IPO, falls at the IPO, and increases again after the IPO. Fig. 1 is illustrative; it is not drawn to scale. Some firms may go public after a Series B round, others after a Series G round etc.
Discovery and Preclinical Testing: The drug development process usually begins with the scientific discovery of a gene or other biological pathway involved in a disease. Discovery can take 2-10 years. From discovery, a target for therapeutic intervention is established. Preclinical tests are conducted in the lab using individual cells or sometimes animals to evaluate the safety and potential for effectiveness in humans. If the target is determined to be legitimate, the company files an Investigative New Drug (IND) application with the FDA for clearance to begin testing on humans. Even after these first few years of research and testing, however, most new drug candidates will never make it to the market.
Phase I Trials: Human testing begins. The purpose of a Phase I trial is to use a small number of patients to establish basic safety and maximum dosage parameters.
Phase II Trials: This stage of clinical study is much more involved, requiring many months to plan, set up and recruit trial participants. Phase II is conducted on a larger group of patients with the targeted disease to study the efficacy of the drug at various doses and confirm its safety. They typically use blinding and placebo controls to achieve scientifically sound results. Phase II often lasts two years, and sometimes a drug will undergo multiple Phase II trials for different indications (for example, to treat different types of cancer). This may be the most critical phase in terms of sorting winners from losers. As a rule of thumb, drugs that complete Phase II and move on to Phase III have about a 50% success rate of reaching the market, though some studies suggest the rate is higher.
Phase III Trials: These tests are designed with a specific endpoint-a measurable result that clearly demonstrates success in combating the targeted disease. The endpoint must be agreed upon by the FDA as an outcome that will lead to marketing approval. The trial involves a large group from the targeted patient population and uses controls such as double-blinding (neither patient nor doctor knows who is getting a placebo). Multi-center trials are common to show that results are reproducible when administered in different clinical settings. This pivotal phase often lasts two to three years from initial design to study completion, and here again it is common for drugs to undergo more than one Phase III trial for different indications or to support different therapy combinations.
FDA Approval Process: If a drug successfully completes Phase III, the company gathers all of its clinical data and files an application for marketing approval with the FDA. It often takes three to six months just to prepare the application. Another six to twelve months can pass before an FDA advisory panel reviews the application and makes a recommendation. This advisory panel has expertise in the drug's specific area of therapeutic or disease characteristics, and its recommendation for denial or approval is normally followed by the FDA (though another six to twelve months can pass before that happens).
Modified from an article by James Hale (http://www.theonlineinvestor.com/industries.phtml?content=is_bio2) D is c o v e ry (2 -1 0 ye a rs ) P r e c lin ic a l T e s t in g (L a b a n d a n im a l te s tin g ) a OTHER financing rounds include common equity, private placements, and debt related financings (such as bridge notes and convertible notes).
b Includes all IPO filings, whether ultimately successful or withdrawn.
c "IPO+n" denotes three months after the n th fiscal year-end following the IPO offering date, if the IPO offering was successfully undertaken.
d REVGRW and RDGRW are winsorized at 1,000%. fig. 3 ). Neither panel contains observations at the IPO filing point. A log transformation is applied to all non-indicator variables Z according to LZ = log e [Z +1] where Z ≥ 0 is in $000s. Table 1 provides definitions of data items prior to their being log transformed. An asterisk denotes that the correlation is reliably nonzero at the 5% level under a twotailed test. fig. 3 ). Dollar amounts are in millions. For variable definitions, see table 1. Regression intercept and indicator coefficients are estimated but not reported. Equity valuations at the IPO filing are not included in the regressions. a Model 1: Dependent variable is LPREMV, the log-transformed pre-IPO pre-money equity value of the firm per equation (1) of section 5.3 . Financial statement variables are also all log-transformed. Model 2: Dependent variable is PREMV, the raw pre-IPO pre-money equity value of the firm. Financial statement variables are also raw (i.e., not log-transformed). Model 3: Dependent variable is RPREMV, the rank of PREMV. Financial statement variables are also ranks. b Model 4: Dependent variable is LMVE, the log-transformed post-IPO equity value of the firm per equation (1) of section 5.3 . Financial statement variables are also all log-transformed. Model 5: Dependent variable is MVE, the post-IPO equity value of the firm. Financial statement variables are also raw (i.e., not log-transformed). Model 6: Dependent variable is RMVE, the rank of MVE. Financial statement variables are also ranks. c t-statistic relative to a null coefficient value of zero are in parentheses. 
